Abstract

This article summarizes a longer research initiative analyzing the origin of maximalist stances in the Armenian and Azerbaijani societies during the interwar period of 1994-2020 and the years following the Second Karabakh war through the discussion of how these attitudes were shaped in both societies, why the agents of peace failed to transform them and how it affected the post-2020 situation in the region.

As a year passed since the mass exodus of the Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, with the prospect of their return looking improbable, the peacebuilding community of Armenia and Azerbaijan needs to actively reflect on the past three decades of peace efforts and dialogue initiatives. The Second Karabakh War of 2020 and subsequent events brought about destructive consequences for the peace process by further limiting spaces for narratives of peace and compromise in public discourse. Despite efforts by some activists to advocate a peaceful resolution of the conflict, their stances were marginalized in a deeply nationalistic environment. To understand the causes of this failure, it is crucial to explore the social context of the conflict, including dominant attitudes and perceptions in local societies. In this article, we examine the origins of maximalist stances as one of the main challenges to peace narratives in Armenia and Azerbaijan, from the end of the First Karabakh War until September 2023. This article summarizes a longer research initiative that analyzed official statements from political leaders, media outlets, and academic literature covering social aspects of the conflict. The research data was supplemented by semi-structured interviews with various peace activists, conflict and peace researchers, peacebuilders, and members of cross-border dialogue initiatives from both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Within the framework of the theory of “culture of conflict” developed by Daniel Bar-Tal, we discuss the ethnic and identity-driven character of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict that turned into an irresolvable and uncompromising one, while Nagorno-Karabakh was for a long time perceived as “indivisible territory” in the public consciousness of two nations. Such conflicts are characterized by the usage of both top-down (government propaganda) and bottom-up (collective memory and other public discourses) channels building conflict narratives in societies and strengthening the sense of one-sided victimhood and the demonization of the opposite side. Literature, cinema and art become important tools for maintaining shared emotions and constructing the “enemy image.” As conflicts tend to reify group cohesiveness and foster unity, wartime and military escalations consolidate societies around “ingroup love,” foster mutual support and promote common public narratives and interests. They also reinforce  “outgroup hate” or a negative orientation towards the “other” as a source of threat. Finally, in the most extreme cases, the “other” becomes dehumanized by losing human features and being considered an object in the perception of the “self,” which is particularly relevant for segregated societies living in complete isolation from each other.

In contrast to conflict narratives, the narrative of peace encourages the transformation of negative attitudes through references to the histories of peaceful coexistence and positive memories, re-humanization of the opposite side, reciprocal recognition of grievances, criticism of irredentism and other destructive ideologies, calls for compromise and mutual concessions and so on. These narratives challenge manifestations of polarization, acknowledge the complexity of the conflict and legitimacy of different groups’ grievances, and promote the understanding of shared responsibility in relation to the conflict. In this sense, developing constructive narratives requires embracing alternative and marginalized perspectives and engaging in discussions, all of which would contribute to a richer narrative landscape and new prospects for the establishment of peace and prevention of violence. 

Throughout the interwar period of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, territorial segregation, post-war social trauma, and state propaganda contributed to the radicalization of nationalism in societies and the unwillingness to reach a compromise. Both top-down and bottom-up narratives fueled an existing hostility toward the opposite side, while the promotion of nationalism in official discourse forged the stereotype of a dehumanized enemy, exacerbating the mutual antagonism between the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations. The governments’ dependence on the images raised by their propaganda tools created the so-called “Frankenstein effect,” similar to the consequences of the irresponsible actions of Mary Shelley’s protagonist, making him a hostage of his own invention. While nationalist narratives have gained extensive public support, deviation from the dominant rhetoric has raised the fear of losing political power and influence.

The marginalization of peace promoters’ voices has continuously intensified over the last three decades, juxtaposed with the dominance of ethno-nationalist narrative, which was bolstered by a range of propaganda tools, including the local educational systems, state and non-state media, historiography and literature. Consequently, the conversations held by those who advocated peace in these circumstances remained within a closed circle, unable to address the general public and gradually becoming sidelined by nationalist rhetoric. While some academic studies and publications provided insightful and unbiased analyses of different aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, they could hardly influence the state-controlled peace process. By the late 2010s, the intensity and content of informal dialogue and Track II diplomacy between the conflict parties reached its lowest point since the onset of the conflict in 1988. During the war, several petitions issued by peace activists were somewhat reactive to the developments and remained highly unpopular. 

One of the challenges to the peace narrative before and during the Second Karabakh War was the absence of a shared viewpoint among anti-war advocates, as activists came from diverse ideological backgrounds and identified themselves, among others, as liberals, leftists, anarchists, and/or feminists. The situation was aggravated by the limited and fragmented activity of civil society caused by the state restrictions imposed in post-independence Azerbaijan and pre-2018 Armenia. The short period of democratization and the formation of civil societies in the 1990s was accompanied by public diplomacy and grassroots initiatives, regular meetings between the intelligentsia from both sides of the conflict, public debates, and generally more neutral attitudes within local societies. However, the subsequent decades of authoritarian rule curbed this process when the state in Azerbaijan severely constrained the freedom of speech and general activity of civil society, while in Armenia, it remained underdeveloped and poorly structured. 

In addition to state-imposed obstacles, the technocratic approach adopted by peacebuilding projects among civil society organizations, which prioritized bureaucracy and standardized operational procedures, made it more difficult to promote alternative narratives. These programs were only available to a small number of mainly Western-educated or NGO-based circles, while talks were primarily held in English or a local language using complex concepts that remained unclear to the wider public. Consequently, the peace narratives remained largely "elitist," propagated by Western-funded civil society organizations and spread among a narrow circle of peace activists who were academically  and spoke foreign languages.

Post-2020 war developments revealed the enduring presence of militaristic constructs and nationalist narratives. Although some independent dialogue initiatives emerged shortly after the war, they failed to gain widespread public support. The situation worsened due to the ongoing border clashes, resulting in mass casualties and destruction that created an atmosphere of increasing self-censorship and skepticism toward peacebuilding activity. The surveys held in Armenia and Azerbaijan several months before the September 2023 offensive showed the alignment of maximalist state rhetoric with public opinion. Notably, survey findings reflected prevailing societal stances on conflict resolution, with Azerbaijani respondents predominantly favoring total Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh without any autonomy, while Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh respondents leaned towards independence or unification with Armenia when asked about the status for Nagorno-Karabakh needed to settle the conflict. Finally, the September 2023 offensive and the mass exodus of Armenians from the region once again underscored the impasse in negotiations and the enduring crisis in peacebuilding efforts. In that regard, the concept of the “culture of conflict” explains this failure with the permeation of conflict-related narratives and reinforcement of prevailing nationalist sentiments through the promotion of “selective memory” and moral superiority over the “enemy.” 

Today, as prospects for peace remain far-fetched and the peacebuilding community continues to be marginalized, it is important to reconsider the legacy of the interwar period and the endurance of maximalist attitudes when it comes to building and developing a bridge for cross-border communication and preventing the rise of another escalation in the region. While conflict narratives remain entrenched in the social consciousness, the potential signing of a peace treaty between both parties would offer limited perspectives for regional peace. Creating inclusive spaces for interaction within the public and peacebuilding communities is imperative for fostering innovative strategies and broadening the dissemination of peace narratives. Critically, reassessing dominant nationalist rhetoric, meeting basic societal demands, engaging in self-criticism, and reevaluating the history of the conflict are essential steps towards transforming social attitudes and cultivating a shared narrative of war and peace that will potentially facilitate reconciliation and rebuild trust between societies.

The original article “Perceptions at War: Exploring Public Attitude Formation in the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict” published in Caucasus Survey can be accessed from here.