“My foreign policy will always put the interests of the American people and American security above all else. It has to be first. Has to be. That will be the foundation of every single decision that I make,” stated then-Republican presidential frontrunner Donald Trump, outlining an “America First” foreign policy approach that would remain a cornerstone of diplomatic endeavors during his first presidency.
Analyzing Donald Trump's return to U.S. politics and its implications for the South Caucasus is important due to the region's geopolitical significance, its ties to major global powers, and the potential shifts in foreign policy under a Trump administration. The South Caucasus, comprising Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, is a strategically significant region that sits at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Any change in U.S. policy toward this area could have wide-reaching consequences, both for regional stability and the global balance of power.
The question of whether a return to office by Donald Trump would lead to more engagement with or neglect of the South Caucasus is a nuanced one, shaped by his broader foreign policy philosophy and the shifting geopolitical landscape. While Trump’s foreign policy style is often unpredictable, his focus on limiting U.S. engagement in foreign conflicts, coupled with a preference for direct, bilateral deals, could reshape U.S. involvement in the South Caucasus. This could either lead to greater regional instability or foster new alliances, depending on how U.S. relations with key players like Russia, Turkey, and China evolve.
Trump’s "America First" Doctrine
During his first term as president (2017–2021), Trump’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by the "America First" doctrine, which often prioritized domestic concerns and transactional relationships over long-term commitments to foreign regions. If Trump's foreign policy remains unchanged, the U.S. approach to the South Caucasus could be significantly shaped by a broader isolationist and pragmatic outlook, though some regional factors might drive a more targeted U.S. engagement. Throughout his first presidency, Trump exercised mostly a passive approach to the South Caucasus, focusing more on other regions that were perceived as more strategically important and in accordance with U.S. interests.
Following a broader policy of reducing foreign aid, a de-prioritization of democratic values in favor of security and counterterrorism concerns, and a focus on military alliances, Trump’s first presidency was marked by significant decline and shifts in funding for peacebuilding, democratization, and civil society in the South Caucasus. For instance, U.S. assistance to Armenia dropped substantially from $23.1 million in 2016 to $6.4 million in 2019, with the highest amount received in 2011, totaling $45.2 million. During the Trump administration, Azerbaijan garnered increased attention, largely because of its strategic role in trans-regional energy initiatives like the Southern Gas Corridor and its proximity to Iran, a key adversary in the Middle East. This focus led to a temporary surge in military aid to Azerbaijan, totaling an estimated $58.6 million in 2018 and $42.9 million in 2019. Although Trump initially proposed cutting U.S. funding for Georgia, the country continued to receive aid. From 2017 to 2020, bilateral assistance from the State Department and USAID to Georgia rose to an average of $123 million per year, reaching $131 million in 2020.
The Second Karabakh War, which significantly altered the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus and shifted the region's power dynamics, did not elicit a robust response from the Trump administration. Instead, U.S. officials largely called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, offering a rather passive stance. It is important to note that the Trump administration attempted to mediate the conflict in October 2020, but the effort was unsuccessful. This was likely an attempt by Trump to enhance his international diplomacy ahead of the elections. While Russia and Turkey played active roles in the conflict, there was a prevailing perception that U.S. involvement in the region, particularly during such a volatile period, was unnecessary.
During Trump’s first term, U.S.-Georgia relations were generally stable, with an emphasis on strengthening security ties, supporting Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Trump's skepticism toward NATO enlargement and his transactional view of alliances, as seen in his public comments about NATO members' defense spending, were problematic for Georgia’s NATO aspirations. Moreover, concerns about the unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy, combined with Trump’s occasional soft rhetoric toward Russia, left some uncertainty about the future direction of the U.S.-Georgia relationship.
However, Trump will “inherit” the altered geopolitical landscape in the region. Due to the ongoing war in Ukraine and Russia’s preoccupation with this conflict, the Biden administration managed to increase its involvement in the South Caucasus. Biden also practiced a clear policy in the South Caucasus that focused on fostering peace in Azerbaijani-Armenian and Turkish-Armenian relations.
Georgia's political landscape has been marked by rising internal polarization following the controversial re-election of the pro-Russian Georgian Dream party, which the opposition criticizes for increasing authoritarianism in the country. As a result of the Georgian government's shift towards Russia, the Biden administration has curtailed foreign aid, reduced political engagement, and intensified diplomatic pressure on the Georgian authorities.
Russia, China, and Turkey: Regional Powers Shaping U.S. Policy
Even though Trump's foreign policy has often been vague and unpredictable, it has also been focused on satisfying U.S. interests, especially in the economic sector, primarily applying deal-oriented logic. While the South Caucasus may not be a region of direct interest to the U.S., the regional powers surrounding it, which have their own interests in the area, are important to the U.S. authorities.
Russia has long been the dominant power in the South Caucasus, with its military presence in Armenia and its central role in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Trump’s return to office could further solidify this Russian influence if he continues his policy of engaging with Moscow rather than challenging its regional dominance. The South Caucasus could see even less U.S. involvement, as Trump may prioritize cooperation with Russia over asserting American influence in a region where Moscow holds significant sway.
The outcome of the Ukraine conflict will serve as a significant external factor shaping the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. Should Donald Trump follow through on his pledge to reduce U.S. military support for Ukraine, this could, in turn, bolster Russia's strategic influence in the region, irrespective of whether a formal settlement is reached. As a result, Russia may intensify its military and political presence in the South Caucasus.
China's expanding influence in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may be one factor driving increased U.S. engagement in the South Caucasus, particularly in Azerbaijan and Georgia, which serve as crucial transit hubs for the project. Trump has consistently expressed criticism not only of the BRI but also of China's growing global influence, a stance that could, in turn, lead to greater U.S. focus on countries involved in the initiative. However, this engagement is likely to be confined to economic and infrastructural endeavors, rather than extending to diplomatic or security commitments.
Turkey's increasing presence in the South Caucasus, particularly through its support of Azerbaijan during the Second Karabakh conflict, may also play a role in driving expanded U.S. engagement in the region. Strengthening U.S.-Turkey relations, particularly in the areas of counterterrorism cooperation, NATO commitments, and regional security concerns, could indirectly result in greater U.S. support for Azerbaijan's positions in the region.
Another significant regional actor to consider when evaluating the U.S. stance and involvement in the South Caucasus is Iran, particularly in relation to Armenia. The Trump administration's "maximum pressure" campaign against Iran, which included withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and imposing harsh sanctions, may suggest increased U.S. support for Azerbaijan, Iran's regional rival, while potentially sidelining Armenia, a key Iranian partner. This selective approach could be seen as one of the defining features of Trump's foreign policy in the South Caucasus.
The Second Term
Considering U.S. foreign policy during Trump's first term and the current geopolitical dynamics in the South Caucasus, it is anticipated that U.S. engagement will primarily adhere to Trump's previous transactional approach, emphasizing short-term gains from strategic relationships with regional powers such as Russia, China, and Turkey. Meanwhile, the countries of the South Caucasus will likely need to respond tactically, balancing their own interests with those of the regional powers.
In his second term, Trump is likely to continue the "America First" approach. His announcement that key players in the incoming administration will include Florida Congressman Michael Waltz and Senator Marco Rubio, as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State respectively, suggests a continued emphasis on a self-interested, strategic foreign policy. Both Waltz and Rubio have expressed criticism of U.S. support for Ukraine, advocating that wealthier European nations should assume greater responsibility for Ukraine’s defense. This stance could result in a reduction of the U.S. presence in the region.
Nonetheless, Rubio has demonstrated a particular interest in the South Caucasus, notably through his vocal criticism of Azerbaijan's human rights record and the treatment of Karabakh Armenians. Although predicting the precise trajectory of the incoming Trump administration remains difficult, Rubio's influential role could potentially lead to increased U.S. support for Armenia within the context of the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process. This could also slightly elevate U.S. attention to the South Caucasus, despite the region historically not being a central focus of U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, Rubio's pro-Kurdish position could exacerbate tensions in U.S.-Turkish relations, potentially resulting in a firmer stance toward Azerbaijan. However, it is important to acknowledge that foreign policy is inherently subject to shifts, as it is heavily influenced by prevailing geopolitical dynamics and current events, which often necessitate a more flexible approach.
Should President Trump come to view the South Caucasus as strategically important for energy diversification and reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian energy, it could lead to increased U.S. engagement, particularly with Azerbaijan and Georgia. The Southern Gas Corridor, which connects Azerbaijan’s gas reserves to Europe, may garner heightened attention and participation from the U.S. However, this engagement is likely to be largely transactional, focused on energy agreements and infrastructure projects, rather than on broader diplomatic or political initiatives.
Conclusion
During a second term under President Trump, the South Caucasus is likely to experience greater neglect than active involvement. His foreign policy is expected to continue prioritizing U.S. interests in energy security, counterterrorism, and strategic competition with China and Russia, rather than sustained diplomatic engagement or conflict resolution. While selective interaction with Azerbaijan and Georgia may occur, Armenia is likely to remain marginalized in U.S. policy. Certain key members of Trump's administration might shift some attention to the region, driven by their support for democratization, peace-building efforts, and the containment of external influence from other regional powers. However, overall, the region is expected to experience a reduced U.S. role, as Washington adopts a more detached, transactional approach. Consequently, Russia—and, to a lesser extent, China and Turkey—are likely to exert greater influence in the South Caucasus than the United States.