Istanbul, December 11, 2024
Amid the geopolitical shifts stemming from Russia’s war in Ukraine, Western efforts to contain Moscow, and uncertainties surrounding the incoming Trump administration, heightened regional tensions present both risks and opportunities for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye to collaborate on stabilization. On December 11, 2024, the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation and Caucasus Edition convened experts in Istanbul for a roundtable discussion, exploring these dynamics in depth.
The first session, conducted under the Chatham House Rule, facilitated candid dialogue among Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Turkish experts. Azerbaijani speakers acknowledged progress in bilateral negotiations while emphasizing the challenges of deep mistrust between the sides. They proposed prioritizing practical mechanisms, such as bilateral border management, and focusing on trade routes to incrementally build relations . They also advocated for parallel trust-building efforts across multiple tracks, warning that unaddressed generational traumas, including those by the Azerbaijanis displaced during the First Karabakh War in the 1990s, could hinder normalization. They highlighted the importance of acknowledging mutual grievances stemming from the First Karabakh War, in addition to the 2020 conflict.
Armenian participants highlighted significant progress in Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations, with 15 of 17 treaty articles agreed upon, and advances in border delimitation and meaningful discussions over unblocking connectivity. However, they highlighted critical hurdles to the normalization of relations, including the narrative within Azerbaijan that frames Armenia as "Western Azerbaijan"—a discourse that Armenia views with growing concern—alongside Baku's demand for constitutional amendments in Armenia, which has been voiced by Azerbaijani officials as a condition for signing a peace deal. They emphasized that a peace treaty alone would not ensure lasting peace due to low societal readiness for reconciliation. Historical precedents underscore the risks of agreements failing when populations are unprepared for change. Participants called for forward-looking approaches to foster sustainable peace.
The second session of the roundtable was open to the public. The first speaker, Zaur Shiriyev, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, emphasized the importance of terminology in framing current negotiations. While often referred to as a "peace process," Shiriyev argued that "normalization process" is a more accurate description. He noted that the term "peace process" can be misleading—too broad in its implications of security, stability, and coexistence, yet too narrow to capture the specific and pragmatic steps required to normalize relations. However, he noted that while the state is leading the normalization process, there has been little discussion about what peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia truly means. At present, both societies have a vague and incomplete understanding of the concept of peace — it remains undefined, undiscussed, and devoid of substance. This gap must be addressed through the active participation of civil society groups and experts. Where states are unable to drive this process directly, they can use their influence to encourage and facilitate such discussions within both societies.
Shiriyev elaborated on the differing definitions of security held by Armenia and Azerbaijan. For Armenia, security primarily means avoiding another war, whereas for Azerbaijan, it encompasses the elimination of perceived threats and the establishment of long-term stability. As such, portraying the negotiations as a "peace process" oversimplifies the complex dynamics at play. He warned that framing the agreement as a comprehensive solution could foster unrealistic expectations among both societies, and ultimately lead to disappointment. Instead, Shiriyev suggested that the agreement—if signed—should be seen as a first step, enabling the establishment of diplomatic relations while leaving much work to be done on deeper issues to achieve lasting peace.
Shiriyev also challenged the perception that Baku lacks interest in finalizing the agreement. He argued that the substantial progress made thus far—over 90% of the text has reportedly been agreed upon—would not have been possible if Azerbaijan were disengaged. "If Baku had no interest in signing the agreement, it would have torpedoed the process from the very beginning," Shiriyev asserted.
One key factor shaping Azerbaijan’s cautious approach, according to Shiriyev, is its expectation of dividends in return for signing the agreement—a dynamic that is often misunderstood. He noted that the U.S. government recognized this need, offering a package to "sweeten the deal" just weeks before the November elections. However, this opportunity was missed, partly due to Baku’s reluctance to engage with an outgoing administration and grant it credit for progress.
Looking ahead, Shiriyev posed a critical question: whether the Trump administration will seize the opportunity to advance the agreement. He suggested that the incoming administration might approach the Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement transactionally. Given that the deal is largely complete, Trump could potentially leverage it as a quick international success story. However, Shiriyev also acknowledged the counterargument: Trump may deprioritize this issue in his first six months or longer, focusing on domestic matters, and may not offer the same "peace dividend package" that the Biden administration proposed in October.
Philip Gamaghelyan, Associate Professor at the University of San Diego and editor at Caucasus Edition, agreed with Shiriyev that the current efforts by Armenia and Azerbaijan should not be regarded as a peace process. Unlike Shiriyev, he did not see it as a normalization process either, but rather as an official negotiation process over a narrow set of topics. These talks are focused on resolving specific issues hampering normalization, such as mutual recognition and the modalities of patrolling the shared border. While addressing these challenges would mark an important step toward eventual normalization, Gamaghelyan emphasized that any agreement, if signed, will likely address only a limited set of issues while introducing new ones, such as the rights of those affected by the conflict. Additionally, some concerns—particularly those related to connectivity—will remain unaddressed.
Gamaghelyan drew contrast between this narrow approach and the more comprehensive peace process following the First Karabakh War in the 1990s. That earlier process envisioned sustainable peace through democratization and the expansion of minority rights. For nearly two decades, he said, official negotiations were complemented by civil society initiatives aimed at normalization. In contrast, Gamaghelyan suggested looking at the current negotiations as a form of conflict management. This incremental approach focuses on resolving the most immediate and compromise-ready challenges, such as mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations, which could lay the groundwork for addressing more complex challenges in the future.
Despite its limitations, Gamaghelyan argued that the current narrow format offers several advantages. For the first time in over 30 years, negotiations are being conducted directly and bilaterally, with Armenia and Azerbaijan asserting agency and ownership of the process. In particular, the Armenia government—no doubt influenced by the devastating military defeat—has prioritized achieving peace with its neighbors and in the past few years has consistently demonstrated a constructive approach and a willingness to compromise. Against a backdrop of regional crises—from Syria and Israel-Gaza to Georgia and Ukraine—the Armenia-Azerbaijan-Türkiye axis currently represents a relatively calm area where long-term stability might be achieved.
However, Gamaghelyan warned that the window of opportunity for normalization and regional stability may not last much longer. A range of developments—such as a ceasefire in Ukraine or escalating tensions in Georgia or between the U.S. and Iran—could once again turn the South Caucasus into an arena of contestation. In such a scenario, Baku, Yerevan, and Ankara will find themselves competing with a broader array of regional and international actors for influence and agency.
Gamaghelyan further noted that upcoming elections in Armenia pose additional risks. With little to show for his peace agenda—due to Ankara’s delay to deliver on agreements and Baku’s escalating demands—Prime Minister Pashinyan is likely to face growing domestic pressure. The government’s sharp pivot toward the West in 2023 already reflects its need to seek alliances beyond the region amidst stalled progress with Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Gamaghelyan concluded by suggesting that Pashinyan’s government might also lose power, either through elections or a coup, if it fails to deliver on its peace agenda. Given the composition of Armenia’s opposition forces, any future government is likely to abandon the current progress and reset the negotiation process to square one.
Nigar Göksel, Crisis Group’s Türkiye Director, highlighted Ankara’s longstanding policy of linking normalization with Armenia to progress in resolving the Karabakh conflict. For decades, Ankara maintained that opening the border would reduce Armenia’s incentive to compromise in negotiations with Azerbaijan. From 1993 to 2020, Türkiye largely conditioned normalization on Armenian concessions to Azerbaijan, particularly the return of territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. Göksel noted that before the 2020 war, Baku supported Ankara-Yerevan normalization under the condition that these territories be returned diplomatically. However, after reclaiming them militarily with Türkiye’s support, Azerbaijan’s position evolved. The military victory strengthened Baku’s bargaining power, leading to adjusted expectations.
Although Türkiye-Armenia bilateral talks after 2020 showed some progress—such as appointing envoys, launching cargo flights, and preparing border infrastructure—their mid-2022 agreement to allow third-country nationals to cross the land border has yet to materialize. Ankara has provided no clear explanation for the delay. Göksel observed that Ankara often employs deliberate ambiguity in its Armenia policy, likely to maintain flexibility. However, this ambiguity can sometimes lead to interpretations that are counterproductive for Türkiye, such as perceptions of Ankara having malicious intentions—whether as an unreliable negotiation partner or as being intent on making Armenia suffer. Such perceptions, she noted, can ultimately undermine Ankara’s objectives.
From Ankara’s perspective, Göksel argued, reopening the Türkiye-Armenia border would gain greater economic significance if Armenia and Azerbaijan also opened their borders, positioning Armenia as part of a trade corridor to Eurasia. Having said that, despite deferring to Baku on the timing of normalization, Ankara views the current moment as favorable for progress. Göksel agreed with Gamagheyan that two factors stand out: Armenia’s leadership adopting a constructive stance and the broader regional environment’s ongoing crises. Azerbaijan’s post-2020 military advantage, Russia’s distraction, Iran’s vulnerabilities, and the limited influence of Western powers in the South Caucasus create a conducive moment. Ankara also recognizes that this window of opportunity may close as geopolitical rivalries intensify and pressures mount on Armenia’s government domestically and internationally.
Delays in Türkiye-Armenia normalization persist, however, as Baku remains focused on finalizing bilateral negotiations with Armenia and securing financial dividends from the West. These priorities influence the pace of progress in the Türkiye-Armenia dialogue. While this might appear as if Baku dictates Ankara’s policies, Göksel suggested the relationship is more one of mutual persuasion, with both sides leveraging influence over each other as needed.
Göksel also addressed the mutual mistrust in Türkiye-Armenia relations. While Armenia’s trust deficit is well-documented, she emphasized that Türkiye’s mistrust is less understood. Many in Ankara’s policy circles perceive Armenia as deeply anti-Turkish and open to manipulation by external powers—whether Russia, Iran, or Western capitals—that Ankara sees, to varying degrees, as seeking to contain Türkiye.
Targeted civil society engagement, Göksel suggested, could help bridge some of the trust deficits. She noted that Türkiye’s and Armenia’s civil societies, even those that once collaborated, have grown apart in recent years. “Considering that borders could open at any time, Türkiye and Armenia’s civil societies are arguably less prepared than ever,” Goksel remarked. This drift stems from differing perceptions of the Second Karabakh War and Turkish NGOs’ focus on domestic and regional crises, which have diminished their capacity for cross-border initiatives.
In conclusion, Göksel contended that while opening borders will not resolve all issues, keeping them closed exacerbates the risks Ankara aims to avoid—geopolitical rivalries, the rise of hardliners in Armenia, and destabilizing disruptions.
The roundtable discussion that followed delved into the potential for escalation in the South Caucasus, with participants weighing the risks and dynamics shaping regional stability. While some noted that the possibility of an Azerbaijani offensive remains, most experts noted it was highly unlikely due to the absence of tangible benefits. Türkiye also seemed uninterested in fostering conflict. However, concerns were raised that escalation could occur if Prime Minister Pashinyan’s government were to lose power, possibly triggering preemptive measures by Baku.
The discussions further identified actionable opportunities to advance normalization and collaboration in the region. Opening borders between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye emerged as a pivotal step that could catalyze regional trade and connectivity, strengthening economic ties and fostering interdependence. At the same time, addressing the deep trust deficits between the societies requires targeted civil society initiatives. These efforts, participants argued, must encourage honest, cross-border conversations and rebuild relationships that have frayed over decades. Preventing escalation, the participants emphasized, hinges on reshaping societal narratives and fostering cross-border trust. Education and dialogue were highlighted as essential tools to bridge divides and reduce tensions, laying the groundwork for more sustainable peace efforts.
Türkiye’s central role in securing sustainable normalization in the region was a recurring theme. Participants stressed that Ankara must carefully balance its alignment with Azerbaijan while advancing normalization with Armenia. This approach is vital to countering external influences and mitigating risks of instability in the region. To sustain these efforts, institutional mechanisms and multi-track diplomacy were recommended as tools to prioritize conflict transformation and economic integration, ensuring long-term stability.
The roundtable underscored that while significant challenges persist, this moment represents a unique opportunity for strategic efforts toward normalization and collaboration. By fostering trust, opening borders, and embracing proactive conflict management, the South Caucasus can move toward a future of stability and shared prosperity.