“Decolonization” has become the new buzzword in the post-Soviet space, echoing across academic halls, activist circles, and even the corridors of power. While in the global South (and in Western academia), terms like “decolonization”, “post-colonial” and “neocolonialism” have been ubiquitous since mid-last century, it seems that the post-Soviet space has discovered them recently. The relentless invocation of this term often turns a profound concept into a catch-all slogan. Moreover, it is often manipulated. Russian propagandists sometimes use language of decolonization to justify actions of the Russian government. Yet, there is a reason why these terms are used more and more often: words like “decolonization”, “anti-colonial”, “post-colonial” resonate with people in our region, because they reflect a reality that many people are facing. As people around the post-Soviet space are increasingly seeing their experience in terms of breaking away from colonial and neocolonial structures of domination, the South Caucasus is also following this trend. And it is directly related to the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
One of the reasons why these terms have become so ubiquitous, is that they offer a compelling explanation for what is going on in the world. More than mere diagnosis, they provide a motivation to act, urging societies to dismantle colonial and neocolonial structures. And in some cases, including ours, concepts like “decolonization”, “postcolonial” etc. help to understand enduring conflicts as legacies of colonial policies. In our case more and more people on both sides of the Armenia-Azerbaijan border are coming to the realization that imperial “divide and conquer” policies are at least one of the factors that had contributed to the enduring conflict for decades. The idea of decolonization instills hope that the peace will emerge not from dominance of a third power that imposes its order on the region, as has been the case in the past, but from mutual recognition and shared interests.
Sometimes, decolonization happens live, on the screens of our television sets, or rather phones and laptops. On April 1, a meeting took place between prime-minister Pashinyan and president Putin, which became a topic of heated discussion, not only in Armenia, but around the post-Soviet space. Pashinyan confidently resisted Putin's pressure. He rebuffed Putin's attempts to push the Kremlin’s agenda on Armenia’s internal politics, as well as on issues like CSTO, EU ties, and Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. And even offered a small lecture on benefits of free internet. Pashinyan's stance showed a mindset shift in Armenian politics: in the past Armenian leaders, including Pashinyan himself, did not talk like that to Russian politicians.
While Pashinyan’s confidence seemed unprecedented for Armenia-Russia relations, it echoed a tone that has already become more or less normal in Baku’s relations with Moscow. At least since the tragic incident involving the shooting of the AZAL airplane by Russian military in 2024, Azerbaijan has been openly challenging the Kremlin in bilateral relations. Of course, the styles of the two leaders are different. Rather than have an open confrontation, president Aliyev prefers to send signals, which are diplomatic and graceful, but easy to read. Thus, many remember “the absence of substantive communication” between Aliyev and Putin at the Beijing summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Aliyev’s conspicuous absence at the 80th anniversary May 9 celebration in Moscow and at the informal CIS meeting in St. Petersburg in December last year.
The communication styles of the two leaders may be different, but the messages they are sending to Moscow are similar: treating neighbors as vassal states is no longer acceptable. Of course, it has never been acceptable, but our countries have had to put up with the Kremlin’s style of politics, because of Moscow’s leverage on both states – the conflict. Russia’s post-colonial or neocolonial influence over post-Soviet countries is multifaceted. But in our case the enduring conflict, and Moscow’s role as the moderator or manager of this conflict, was key to its neo-colonial influence in the region.
Of course, there are obvious differences between the two countries. Armenia’s dependence has historically been high, and although it is decreasing the inertia of Russian influence is stronger today in Armenia than it is in Azerbaijan. But the trend is obvious. Russia is losing its neocolonial privileges in Armenia and Azerbaijan and there is not much that can be done about it. And one of the main reasons why this is happening is the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan: Armenia and Azerbaijan are sorting things out on their own, and no longer letting themselves be used against each other
Other post-Soviet leaders have also rebuked Putin in public meetings more than once. Take for example, Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s rebuke to Russia over occupied Ukrainian regions or the “language diplomacy” incident. Or Tajikiastan’s Emomali Rahmon’s “we want respect” speech. In many ways these episodes are similar to what Aliyev and Pashinyan are doing in relations with Moscow: setting clear boundaries of what is acceptable in relations between independent states. But in case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, their ability to stand up against Russian pressure is directly related to their ability to overcome the legacy of conflict.
Yet, we must be wary of excessive optimism. It is important to notice and value the positive dynamic, but also it is important not to take it for granted. Things can change quickly. A lot depends on the result of the upcoming Armenian election. And not only for Armenia. A pro-Russian opposition victory in Armenia could reverse the gains that have been made and bring to country back to a post-colonial framework. These forces do not openly reject the peace process with Azerbaijan, but they are promising to bring Russia back into the picture as a guarantor of peace. Obviously, such a move would either sabotage the peace process entirely, or, at the very least, bring Russia back into the position of the conflict’s moderator, restoring its neocolonial hegemony in our region. I am hopeful that this choice will be rejected by the majority of Armenian voters, but to a large extent the outcome of the election depends also on Azerbaijan’s actions and rhetoric.
Another concern is more long-term. While getting rid of Moscow’s neocolonial influence is a must, it is equally vital to avoid forming other neocolonial dependences. History shows that when one empire withdraws, it is often replaced by another. Obviously, sometimes getting rid of destructive influence of one external actor demands relying on the support of others. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have their own partners among regional and global players. Some of these have been traditional allies, and others are relative newcomers in our region. In some cases, the support of these actors has been indispensable, as in the case of Washington accords and the ensuing peace process. But, we need to remember that true decolonization demands self-reliance—building peace through bilateral talks, regional cooperation, and internal reforms. Only then can we transform buzzwords into lasting transformations.