RECENT NEWS

World Bulletin

April 12, 2013

Iran, Russia discuss Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

 Full article at: http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=106540

Radio Free Europe

April 13, 2013

Deadly shooting reported near Nagorno-Karabakh

Full article at:http://www.rferl.org/content/deadly-shooting-reported-near-nagorno-karabakh/24952111.html

Trend.az

April 9, 2013

US calls upon Nagorno-Karabakh conflict parties to achieve peaceful settlement

Full article at: http://en.trend.az/news/karabakh/2136996.html

News.az

April 11, 2013

Karabakh problem is a threat to regional security

Full article at: http://commonspace.eu/eng/azerbaijan/6/id2647

ArmInfo

April 9, 2013

USA calls upon parties to Karabakh conflict to retain from the use, or threat of the use of force

Full article at: http://commonspace.eu/eng/azerbaijan/6/id2645

News. az

April 9, 2013

There is a need for progress in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process

Full article at: http://commonspace.eu/eng/azerbaijan/6/id2644

commonspace.eu

April 15, 2013

ArmInfo: OSCE CiO Special representative travels to South Caucasus

Full article at: http://commonspace.eu/eng/armenia/6/id2649

ANALYSIS

Azernews,   April 19 , 2013
Idea to open flight between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh purely of political nature

Full article at: http://www.azernews.az/azerbaijan/52523.html

PRweb. com, April 22, 2013

New economic collaboration initiative to end Nagorno-Karabakh conflict discussed in London

Full article at: http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/4/prweb10643065.htm

REPORTS

Journal of Eurasian Studies, April 17, 2013
An analytical study of geopolitical consequences of normalization of Turkish-armenian relations

 Full article at:

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1879366513000195

The use of education as a conflict promoter is evident within the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite the ceasefire and ongoing peace negotiations, both Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders have been preparing their constituency for a renewed war rather than peace. Education, therefore, has been mainly used as a propaganda tool. History and other textbooks have been altered and used as brainwashing and influencing methods on the younger generation.

As it is with other territorial conflicts, within the Nagorno-Karabakh context, both conflict sides are always keen to prove by any means possible that these lands historically belong to them and that the opposite side arrived after them. This is reflected throughout the educational system, including history textbooks and classes. Each side tries to de-emphasize the opposite side’s roots and presence in the region as much as possible. Even if the name of the other side is mentioned in some sentences, it is written in such a way so that it does not draw special attention. Education based on these altered books leads to one-sided understanding and groundless preconceptions about the other. For instance, students begin to think that if the opposite side’s name (nation’s name) is not mentioned in history books until the 15th century, then that nation is not so ancient and they are not indigenous to those lands, and thus, do not deserve to be there. As there are no alternative sources, readers are not able to ponder over their accuracy.

Another tactic is to keep the painful memories alive. For instance, the Ministry of Education of Azerbaijan added a page under the heading of “Bloody memory! Don’t forget! The territories had been occupied by Armenian aggressors” to the diary of pupils in which their daily marks have to be noted. There is also detailed information about the occupied lands during Nagorno-Karabakh war on that page. Surely, providing impressionable youth with this kind of propagandistic information pushes them to consider their historical neighbors as their definite and most vicious enemy in the world.  Similar propaganda processes have been carried out in the Armenian society too. For instance, in Armenia, it is generally propagated to teens and youngsters that “Your number one enemies are Turks.” [i]This kind of rhetoric is also reinforced by the leaders as well. For example, during the Armenian language and literature contest on 25^th July 2011, Armenian president Serj Sarkisyan told a group of students: “We liberated part of our motherland –Artsak (Nagorno Karabakh) from the enemy in 1990s. Every generation has its own duty and liberating Agri mountain is your duty”  (Mammadli and Allahyarova 2009, 14). By taking into account the audience and influential role and position of the author of these words, one can imagine the impact it would have on 10-12 years old pupils.

All examples mentioned above are a manipulation of education for particular purposes. Through manipulative “education” or rather ethnocentric or racist indoctrination, people are enslaved by their own irrational aggressive impulses, losing, in the process, their human autonomy that is based on their capacity to think. As a result, each of these nations has only one “enemy”.  In Armenia, “enemy” and other insulting words are associated with “Turk” (Azerbaijani), whereas “Armenian” is equated with “enemy” or other insulting words in Azerbaijan. Not surprisingly, youth from both societies not only avoid contact with each other, but also refrain from interacting with each other when they meet in neutral zones for the first time while participating in conferences and workshops.

I was confronted with this reality when I recently visited front line regions to get a first-hand look at how conflict-promoting education has impacted younger generations. I found a small school building in one of the villages situated along the front line, only 300-400 meters away from the point where skirmishes frequently take place. Talking to students of this school in an attempt to make any peaceful change in their minds is very difficult to do. I received different opinions expressed by the teens studying in that school. When asked whether he would like to go back to Kalbajar and live there together with Armenians, one of the students I interviewed – a 15-year old boy originally from Kalbajar and currently residing in Tartar – answered that he was, “afraid of Armenians, [because] they always killed our ancestors, babies, people savagely” (with anxiety and fear).[ii] He said that he came to this opinion from reading textbooks and other books, and also his teachers always talk about this at school.

Some of them regretfully emphasized that the conditions they had to live under were very difficult. Although they did not want to admit, it was clear that they were in favor of peace. Nevertheless, there were students with more war-prone attitudes. Almost every day, they hear gunshots or see someone injured or killed by a mine. Sometimes they see people shot dead or wounded by snipers. Teachers also do their part by reinforcing the grim reality by offering current and historical examples to foster the “enemy” image in their minds. As a result, these kind of undesirable tendencies impede creation of any positive peace-favoring thoughts in their minds.

In order to get a balanced understanding and a better sense of the role of education on the opposite side, I interviewed Armenians as well. It should be noted that these interviews took place via internet and with the help of my Armenian friends, since it was impossible for me to visit Armenia or Nagorno-Karabakh.  I posed the same question to Armenians about the prospect of living together with Azerbaijanis. One interviewee told me that his secondary school teacher used to tell students that Azerbaijanis were worse than Turks. He said that he was wondering why Turks were so bad, and why Azerbaijanis were worse. “It was like some shameful obscenity, if teacher says you are ‘Turk’ or ‘Azeri’,” he noted.. According to him, all of their readings in history books were all the scary and inhuman things that the “enemy” had committed to their children and women. “But later I saw that every ‘enemy’ of every single country does bad things, because this is all about war you know, and I see that war is always bad, cruel”, he added. “I would do the same things with a Turk guy, and there are surely so many people, youth who is/are thinking like this”.  Certainly, there are lots of people who do not want to be an enemy to anyone. “But it is getting harder and harder, because more of our children think “‘they are’ evil and ‘they’ should die!”[1]

Though there are general opinions and ideas about the conflict in the society, results differ, because these dialogues and interviews were conducted among different age groups from various regions of Azerbaijan and Armenia. According to the observation, three age groups can be identified in terms of attitude to the perceived “enemy nation”. The younger generation is more aggressive because of the propaganda in education, media and many spheres of public life and the absence of communication between the sides. Moreover, absence of favorable conditions for alternative thinking further enhances aggressive posture among the youth. In all spheres of life – including in education – aggressiveness is dictated to them. Young people with alternative views in both societies are those who at least once visited a third country and met the members of the opposite side at meetings, conferences or workshops. Compared to youth, the middle-aged generation of both societies is less aggressive toward each other. Despite the fact that their youth coincided with the war years, they studied together in the same educational system and witnessed the negative aspects and tragedy of war. The perception of the older generation is totally different. In the discussion with them, I have noticed that most of them remember how they lived together friendly, in peace before the war. If we summarize the thoughts mentioned above, for the most part, people who completed their education before the war took place and therefore did not undergo the influence of war-prone textbooks and school/university discourse, are more prone to peace and if possible, they would live together with the opposite side in their homeland.

Given the above described state of affairs, the concept of education as a peace facilitator seems unattainable. Nevertheless, in some conflict contexts there is an effort to shift the rhetoric within the education system. As an example of education as facilitator for peace, I want to stress the Israel-Palestinian conflict which is going on, nowadays. In spite of this situation, there are some joint schools which the target is to teach the history of the region from both side’s perspectives. In the current situation, to implement this kind of long-term project does not seem possible within the Azerbaijani and Armenian education systems, which are under the ideological monopoly by their states. While some private universities may have more autonomy to include history curriculum based on joint textbooks, it is more realistic that different projects on conflict transformation and confidence-building measures by local organizations from both sides will serve as informal avenues for peace education. It is important to use these opportunities of non-governmental organizations and institutions working in this field and the methods of non-formal education. Educating youth on conflict resolution skills and providing them with an alternative view is the starting point of peace.

 Bibliography

Lederach, John Paul (1997) In Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, D.C.: US. Institute of Peace Press

Goodhand, Jonathan and Hulme, David (1999); From Wars to Complex Political Emergencies: Understanding Conflict and Peace-building in the New World Disorder. Third World Quarterly Vol. 20, No. 1

Ramsbothan, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall (2005) Contemporary Conflict Resolution (2nd Ed.). Cambridge, MA: Polity Press

Mammadli, Atamoglan and Allahyarova, Nurida (2009) Mea Culpa Confession of Armenian Elite

Since the start of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, USA and Russia have pursued various interests in and around that conflict. Their behaviors come from some circumstances both directly and indirectly related to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. In this work, I review three dimensions of the interests of these actors: energy, geographic and geopolitical-instrumental. The structure of those interests is a complex one, shaping a system with four level triangles.

1. The first level involves the three non-recognized and partly recognized subjects of the South Caucasus, namely Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The interests of the USA and Russia link to Nagorno-Karabakh somewhat through Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well, since all of them are undivided parts of the region and serve either as obstacles or as tools for the two great powers. Hence, developments on one of those conflicts definitely affect the whole geopolitical environment of the others as well.
2. The second level triangle includes the three recognized states of the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. As the core subjects of the region, all of them are under Washington and Moscow’s scope of interest. Since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of the key factors shaping the geopolitics of the South Caucasus, its prism of the second triangle looking from the parties of Russia and the USA is unavoidable. This triangle becomes more important, when we take into account that the internationally recognized parties of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (i.e. Armenia and Azerbaijan) with another conflicting state (i.e. Georgia) to build the second triangle.
3. The third triangle consists of the three external powers immediately neighboring the South Caucasus: Turkey, Iran and Russia. These regional powers have interests strongly connected to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although Turkey and Iran are sufficiently independent players in the region, their interests in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are to some extent conditioned with Moscow’s and Washington’s interests as well. The involvement of Russia in the third triangle is explained by its immediate neighborhood of the region, which makes it a direct player there.
4. The parties of the fourth triangle are the USA, Russia and the EU. Here the latter is the weakest great power presented in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, that’s why especially Russia’s and the USA’s interests have been taken for reviewing in this paper.Noticeably, Russia is a party of both the third and the fourth triangles, because it has a super weight in the region and, in particular, in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The overall picture of the interested parties in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is presented in the figure 1 below.

The energy dimension

The energy dimension of the interests of Russia and USA in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict relates to the conflict zone indirectly, since the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is not rich of energy resources. However, the conflict affects the energy interests of Russia and the USA in the region, since it is a strong security factor in exploiting the Azerbaijani hydrocarbon resources. When in 1994 the “contract of the century” was signed between Azerbaijan and oil companies from Russia, the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom to exploit the oil of the Caspian Sea’s Azeri-Chirag-Gunashali field (Ismailzade, 2005; Yergin, 2011: 54), it launched the competition in particular between the USA and Russia for the regional energy resources and communications. That rivalry has become more salient in the South Caucasus when the USA supported to the constructions of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas (South Caucasus) pipeline, by which the Azerbaijani hydrocarbon resources are being transported to Europe via Georgia and Turkey. Recently, the West has concentrated its attention to a new pipeline project (i.e. the Trans-Anatolia (TANAP) gas project), which aims to link the Azerbaijani and Central Asian gas reserves to Europe (Socor, 2012). Backing those energy projects, Washington seeks some geopolitical goals, such as:

• To diminish the dependence of the West on the Russian and Iranian energy supplies, and, as a result, reducing Iranian and Russian geopolitical heaviness;
• To decrease Moscow’s influence over the South Caucasus;
• To interconnect the countries of the South Caucasus, making the region more predictable and stable.

The constructions of the abovementioned pipelines have strengthened the Moscow-Washington rivalry over the energy resources and communications of the region, where the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in particular as a security factor, has its special place. Hence, any possible renewal of war in Nagorno-Karabakh would put the valuable communications in danger, especially since they run in vulnerable distance from the conflict zone. For example, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is located only 15 kilometers away from the northern border of Nagorno-Karabakh (Akgakoca et al., 2009; German, 2012: 226; Paul, 2010: 2). This means that the powers interested in the security of the pipelines should seek peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or at least maintain the status quo there. On the other hand, since those pipelines aim to ensure the energy security of Europe in a way of bypassing the Russian supplies, Moscow needs to impede the effective implementation of those projects. In that respect, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is considered to be a handy tool with its potential to cause instability (Ismailzade, 2005).

The geographic dimension

Geographically, the South Caucasus is situated at the cross-roads of the East and West, the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea regions, which makes it a significant region for the actors of the third and fourth triangles. That geographic potential is not only limited by energy communications but also for other economic and military purposes. Although energy communications also relate to the geographic dimension, however, due to their strategic significance they are discussed as a separate dimension. Geographically, Nagorno-Karabakh has both direct and indirect significance for the taken powers. Indirectly, it is again a strong security factor for other regional communications. For example, Azerbaijan serves as an air corridor for the coalition forces in Afghanistan and the American bases in Europe (Jones, 2005). Especially after the loss of Pakistan as a partner in the fight against terrorism, the role of the Azerbaijani air corridor has increased for USA. Logically, a new war in the conflict zone would jeopardize American deliveries to Afghanistan. Taking into account the American-Russian cooperation in the issue of Afghanistan, it could be claimed that here the Russian interests at least do not oppose the American ones. The geography of Nagorno-Karabakh is important for both the USA and Russia from the aspect of the Iranian issue as well. Since Nagorno-Karabakh is an immediate neighbor of Iran, any military attack to Iran may increase the possibility of using the Nagorno-Karabakh territory for anti-Iranian purposes (Jackson, 2010). Undoubtedly, from this point of view, the interests of Moscow and Washington are in disagreement. Therefore, they still keep the status quo, avoiding deployment of peacekeepers in those territories.

The geopolitical-instrumental dimension

Although this dimension may be somewhat related to the first ones, I have separated only the interests where the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict serves as a geopolitical tool or obstacle in the whole region. In particular, the following interests are noteworthy under this dimension:

• The conflict is believed to be the main reason for the failure of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process, since Turkey tries to link those two issues, putting forward a precondition on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Phillips, 2012). Although the USA officially refuses to see any links between the two processes, nonetheless, Turkey’s stern position definitely affects Washington’s approaches to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since, in fact, the latter is the obstacle for achieving one of the most important interests of Washington in the South Caucasus (i.e. opening the Armenian-Turkish border). From Moscow’s perspective, this obstacle may be preferable, since regardless its official positive position to the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process, the open border would increase Turkey’s weight in the region, which is the main regional rival of Russia in the Caucasus (Nixey, 2012). In this case, thanks to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Moscow does not need to oppose the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process, keeping its own positive image in it.
• Nagorno-Karabakh is a strong leverage in the Russian hand to keep powerful influence on Armenia and Azerbaijan. Being the key guarantor of the security of Armenia through bilateral and multilateral contracts, Moscow, however, expands military cooperation with Baku too (Deriglazova and Minasyan, 2011). Obviously, Moscow needs to prevent Baku to go out of the Russian geopolitical orbit, that’s why it tries to have balanced relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. The fact that Armenia relies on the Russian security umbrella compels Azerbaijan to keep good relations with Russia to avoid Moscow’s absolute support to Armenia especially in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and in a possible warfare. Therefore, the current “no peace, no war” uncertain situation seems to be favorable to Russia in retaining a stable leverage over the region. On the other hand, looking through the prism of geopolitical rivalry, Washington needs to weaken the Russian influence on the conflicting parties by changing the current status quo, but only with peaceful means, since war will increase the uncontrollability of the region and will endanger the valuable pipelines.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, interrelated with other geopolitical processes in the region, has shaped a four-triangle structure of actors around it. Being players of the highest-level triangle, the USA and Russia, in a deep sense, have at least competing interests in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since it is an influential factor for the geopolitical atmosphere of the South Caucasus.

Based on the analysis of this paper, it could be claimed that in particular the security factor of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is essential for the taken countries’ interests. Specifically, the stability of the region and the safety of communications (both hydrocarbon and transportation) are highly dependent on the stability and predictability of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which may be manipulated by the USA and Russia for their own interests.

However, it is not only a security factor, but also a decisive geopolitical obstacle or tool for Washington and Moscow on the ways of reaching their interests in the South Caucasus. Especially the cases of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process and maintaining the Russian influence on Yerevan and Baku are of note. So, the hypothesis of this piece of work has been proved.

Bibliography

Akgakoca, A., Vanhauwaert, T., Whitman R. and Wolff, S. (2009). “After Georgia: conflict resolution in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood”. EPC Issue Paper, no.57.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. (1997). The Grand Chessboard.New York, Basic Books.

Deriglazova, Larisa and SergeyMinasyan. (2011). “Nagorno-Karabakh: the paradoxes of strength and weakness of an asymmetric conflict”. Caucasus Institute Research Papers, no. 3.

German, Tracey. (2012).“The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia: Security Issues in the Caucasus”.Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 216-229.

Ismailzade, Fariz. 2005. “The Geopolitics of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”. Global Dialogue, vol. 7, no. 3-4.

Jackson, Alexander. (2010). “Iran Manoeuvres for a role in Karabakh”.Caucasus Update, issue 66, 5 April.Available at: http://cria-online.org/CU_-_file_-_article_-_sid_-_86.html [accessed on 5 August 2012].

James Jones, Gen. (2005). Testimony by Gen James Jones. U.S. Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services, 1 March.

Nixey, James. (2012). “The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia”. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Russia and Eurasia Programme, briefing paper, June.

Paul, Amanda. (2010). “Nagorno-Karabakh—a ticking time bomb”.European Policy Centre, September. Available at: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_1148_nagorno-karabakh.pdf [accessed on 11 August 2012].

Phillips, David L. (2012). Diplomatic History: The Turkey-Armenia Protocols. Institute for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University, March.

Socor, Vladimir. (2012). “Azerbaijan Drives the Planning on Trans-Anatolia Gas Pipeline Project”. Eurasia Daily Monitor, volume 9, issue 164, 11 September.Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39827&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=430fc4b90b81d7ab242768782e4ccbb5 [accessed on 1 September 2012].

Yergin, Daniel. (2011). The Quest. The Penguin Press: New York, NY.

News. Az, March 4, 2013
Nagorno-Karabakh might escalate into war, needs to be solved
http://www.news.az/articles/karabakh/77423

APA.az, March 4, 2013
Barack Obama: “The settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict requires meaningful movement”
http://en.apa.az/news/188874

Contact.az, March 5, 2013
Co-Chairs of the OSCE MG discussed with Elmar Mammadyarov issue of civilian flights
http://www.contact.az/docs/2013/Politics/030500030629en.htm#.UTYXK-uIL6M

News.az, March 18, 2013
The Khojaly Tragedy-spot on the whole of Europe
http://news.az/articles/politics/78060

News.Az, March 19, 2013
We will recognize Karabakh’s independence-Sargsyan
http://news.az/articles/armenia/78127

ANALYSIS
Interview with Gerard Libaridian re Akram Aylis’s book
http://www.contact.az/docs/2013/Interview/030500030749en.htm#.UTYXZOuIL6M

commonspace.eu, March 7, 2013
Refugees must not become the unforgotten problem. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced as a result of conflicts in the Caucasus in the last twenty five years. Their plight is largely forgotten
http://commonspace.eu/eng/azerbaijan/6/id2616

Eurasianet.org, March 13, 2013
Armenia: Yerevan Keen to opt out of New Russian-Led Bloc
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66688

Eurasianet.org March 12, 2013
Azerbaijan: Is the Kremlin Opt to Old Tricks?
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66677

commonspace. eu,
Don’t shoot the messengers, but you do not need to hug them either
http://commonspace.eu/eng/blogs/15/author7/id86

Today’s Zaman.com, March 20, 2013
Yerevan-Van flight: a new route to controversy?
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist-310258-yerevan-van-flight-a-new-route-to-controversy.html

Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, March 6, 2013
New Protest Movement Emerges in Armenia
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5934

Unfortunately, the peacebuilding path in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been very thorny. One of the very recent thorny bushes on this path was Ramil Safarov’s release and pardon. Let the politicians, policy experts and experts in international law argue about the legality of that move. From the peacebuilder practitioner’s point of view, it was an equal defeat for both Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The negative impact that it had on the peacebuilding process on the track-two level was enormous. Many practitioners would argue that it almost reset the years of hard work and that the whole process went back to square one.  Such an unexpected escalation of tensions created an immediate need for a response and intervention and both sides recognized this need. At the same time, a big question of “How?” was lingering on the horizon. How to start the new process while avoiding re-generating the trauma? How to avoid even more and total marginalization in your own society? It would probably be accurate to say that these were only a few out of the many questions that practitioners were facing in the fall of 2012 in both societies.

But as the saying goes: where there is a will, there is a way. Early in January, I attended probably the first meeting of civil society activists, intellectuals and peace practitioners conveyed in Tbilisi. This was an open and somewhat safe forum to discuss how to restore what was lost and how to move forward. The fact that this meeting actually took place is a positive sign in and of itself. People continue to care and invest time and personal effort in confidence building measures, despite limited successes and significant challenges. While meeting was far from friendly and there was somewhat visible nervousness, professional and respectful environment allowed for constructive conversation to develop.

Every participant emphasized and supported a renewed commitment to cooperation and collaboration. However, the damage that was done to the peace process at this level was apparent. I would argue that the desire of the majority of participants to collaborate and work on the level of joint articles and publications one more time reinforces that academia and intellectual work is regarded a “safer” area for cooperation. Even though several ideas on more concrete and tangible projects that would involve on-the-ground work were put on the table for discussion, those hardly found any support among participants. While “interesting” and “important” , those projects seemed to be “outside” of the working interests of participants and the pendulum swung towards more analytical work. With no formal boundaries and with the help of modern technology, practitioners are able to create highly valuable analytical products that are open to exploring new and sometimes unconventional ways of conflict resolution. While analytical work is a very critical part of peacebuilding, its impact is still quite limited, especially given the political realities in Armenia and Azerbaijan. In both countries there is an extensive gap between track one and track two and analytical papers and reports that are produced by highly qualified scholars and analysts rarely, if ever, are reflected in foreign or domestic policy agendas.

Academic and analytical work done by experts on both sides is extremely important, especially when it is done jointly. In my opinion, however, it is the frame of a painting that stills needs to be painted. By concentrating only on this pillar of peacebuilding work, we run the risk of having only a nice, well-finished frame hanging on the wall, which would quickly become useless. While working on the frame, it is equally important to remember that we need to jointly paint the painting that will fill that frame one day. The frame is a product that can be created in the studio of a skilled carpenter, but only getting out to the meadow you would be able to recreate the realistic colors and patterns on the painting.

To be successful peacebuilding work in such protracted conflicts, as the Nagorno-Karabkh conflict, should be multi-vector. Simultaneous projects that involve media and education areas can help soften the enemy image and change the discourse in societies. People-to-people activities can help to restore shattered connections between former colleagues and neighbors, and joint analysis and recommendations produced by scholars and practitioners will help to frame this comprehensive process. While both Armenian and Azerbaijani societies remain nervous about larger scale confidence-building programs, such as reunions of former neighbors, joint meetings in Yerevan and Baku and Stepanakert, satellite TV bridges to allow discussions across the divide, and creative conversations in every village, we are far from painting the picture of a peaceful future that Armenian and Azerbaijani societies will recognize as their own.   Joint work of scholars on policy papers is only one step that needs to be combined with many other kinds of steps. It will take more time and more courage to begin to take those bolder steps.

I remembered the time I first heard about the incident eight years ago.   I was an exchange student at the University of Minnesota, studying together with three Armenian students.  We were all friends hanging out together, discussing our similarities, differences and of course the conflict as much as we could.  One of them gave me the horrifying news that morning. Sitting behind the monitor, where he had just read about this, he tried to described to me what happened between the Azerbaijani and Armenian exchange fellows five thousand miles away, in a hotel in Budapest.  He was shattered by the news.  I was also in shock, thinking about us, as if it happened among ourselves.  As if one of us was the man with an ax, and another one with the beheaded body to be sent back in coffin…

Upon my return to Baku, I began seeing pictures of Ramil Safarov in the windows of the cars and buses I rode.  His picture often hung next to the photo of Mirmovsum Agha, a religious figure and traditional healer who lived in Baku in the mid-twentieth century and was post-mortem elevated to “sainthood”.

In August of 2012, the images of Ramil flooded the television screens once again.  The scenes from the mid-day news showed a group of people led by two MPs and a big, tall guy marching through the burial place of Heydar Aliyev (Alley of Honor), and Martyr’s Alley – the usual route for foreign visitors and local officials on special days.  Facebook and other social media outlets were flooded with messages of young people, expressing joy and pride.  The official news and TV, which comprise majority of news source in Azerbaijan, praised the President for his glorious work for the “motherland”.   It was also reported that Ramil had been promoted to the rank of Major, given a house, and paid his official salary for the eight years that accumulated while he was in jail.[1]

While the majority of state-controlled-media-influenced people, especially youth, welcomed the pardon and celebrated, there was a significant resistance by people who refused to agree with the official rhetoric. In the wake of the murder eight years ago, these sensible voices were rather muffled, as there was expected punishment for the crime. Now that this punishment had been cut “by more than a half”, those voices became more prominent.   For example, Akram Aylisli, an Azerbaijani writer now prominent in the light of his published book “Stone Dreams”, refused to join the campaign of joy, calling it an organized plot and claiming that “he has his own views about heroism”.[2] Independent politician and former presidential candidate Zardusht Alizadeh called the entire event a “dark-age” that “would not liberate a santi-meter of occupied lands and serves the purpose of scoring of public opinion for the President in the times of the fearful for him the Arab Spring”.[3]  Their followers on Facebook continued the interactive discussion with their friends, creating a small, but a significant intellectual counter-weight in the “debate”.

They were primarily concerned not as much about the act of pardoning as they were about the reaction of people who celebrated Ramil as  a hero.  That segment of the society viewed the entire thing as a show  to score points  at internal politics.  Among this “dissatisfied” group were young and prominent writers, some of whom are internally displaced persons from the Nagorno-Karabakh war and have lost their homes and relatives during the Nagorno-Karabakh war.   They believed that Ramil Safarov’s act was nothing but a crime and that axing a man in his sleep could not be equated to heroism. To them, elevating Ramil to a hero’s status was an insult to memories of tens of thousands of true heroes – soldiers and civilians killed in the war and buried in the same Martyr’s Alley.  One of the strong and open criticizers of the situation was Professor Rahman Badalov, a cultural critic who writes for the Kultura.az portal.  In his “My point of view” editorial he clearly called Ramil Safarov’s act a crime which did not suit an officer and said such idolization only serves to fuel hatred and racism[4].

The same group argued that the pardoning damaged the image of the country: because of this act, the Azerbaijani government played into the hands of Azerbaijan’s adversaries and eroded the sympathies of those neutral arbitraries involved in the solution of the conflict.  Indeed, the condemning reaction of the Minsk Group chair states and EU shortly followed.

The saddest part and probably the biggest harm to country’s overall image in the eyes of true democrats of Azerbaijan was that the opposition party leaders, who are believed to be the faces of the pro-democracy movement, graciously accepted the Government’s invitation to join the anti-EU petition it drafted in response to former’s condemnation.   It was equally sad to observe a new opposition group called Republican Alternative (REAL), which is composed of the younger generation of Western-educated professionals also praising the President’s act of pardon.

The peacebuilding community in Azerbaijan in their joint petition also found “a reasoning” in this act however “condemning it overall”.  They found similarities in this act and extradition and immediate the pardon by Armenian President Robert Kocharyan of Varoujan Garabedian, ASALA member in 2001 who in 1983 was charged in with bombing the Turkish Airlines check-in desk at Orly Airport that took the lives of eight and wounded 50.[5]  Originally Garabedian was also sentenced to life imprisonment in France[6].

What happened showed how vulnerable the Azerbaijani society is when it comes to the ultimate nationalistic issues, often named as “national-moral values”.  It seemed as if everyone started to think the same way and, in a euphoric state, backed and joined the crowd, choosing to be extremely careful in speaking their “other part of me”.   The pardoning and ensuing reactions was as much of a setback to peacebuilding as it was for democratic reform in Azerbaijan.

While the pardon may have set back whatever progress peace talks and initiativesachieved during past 20 years, the novel “Stone Dreams” by Akram Aylisli written 6 years ago, but published only recently may play a role in bringing back what was thought to be lost if of course, the orchestrated alienation of the writer stops.  The writer, known for his “internationalism” from the Soviet days, has tried to demonstrate through his novel that Azerbaijanis can think differently, that they are ready to understand and sympathize with their neighbors’ grievances, hoping that the opposite side will reciprocate.  Only time will show whether a single act of courage of publishing an unpopular book that depicts the “enemy” in a positive light can begin to undo the damage done by the pardoning of Ramil Safarov and whether it will encourage progressive and peace-oriented segments of the society to speak up when it matters most.

OSCE
February 5, 2013
OSCE chairperson meets Minsk Group Co-Chairs on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement
Full article at: http://www.osce.org/cio/99210

The Moscow Times
February 6, 2013
Azerbaijan says 2 soldiers Killed Near Disputed Nagorno-Karabakh

Full article at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/azerbaijan-says-2-soldiers-killed-near-disputed-nagorno-karabakh/475148.html

Trend.az
February 6, 2013
Ukraine considers OSCE as a unique platform for Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict dialogue

Full article at: http://www.oananews.org/content/news/politics/ukraine-considers-osce-unique-platform-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-dialogue

commonspace.eu
February 8, 2013
Azerbaijan: “Situation tense”, Armenia: “Situation normal”.
Full article at: http://commonspace.eu/eng/news/6/id2565

Calgary Herald
February 9, 2013
Nagorno-Karabakh says Armenian Soldier killed by sniper
Full article at: http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/NagornoKarabakh+says+Armenian+soldier+killed+sniper/7943198/story.html

commonspace.eu
February 14, 2013
Sargsyan says war is not a solution for the Karabakh problem
Full article at: http://commonspace.eu/eng/news/6/id2577

Guardian
February 18, 2013
Armenia’s president win re-election, exit polls show
Full article at:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/18/armenia-president-election-poll

thestar.com
February 24, 2013
Armenia and Azerbaijan still striking war in Nagorno-Karabakh
Full article at:http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/02/20/armenia_and_azerbaijan_still_skirting_war_in_nagornokarabakh.html

ANALYSIS

The National Interest, January 31, 2013
Another Regional War in the Wings
Full article at: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/another-regional-war-the-wings-8042

commonspace.eu, February 4, 2013
To what extent have Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia deteriorated?
Full article at: http://commonspace.eu/eng/opinions/6/id2559

Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, February 6, 2013
Azerbaijan breaks through into Eastern Europe
Full article at: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5921

commonspace.eu, February 6, 2013
New Challenges to Armenian-Iranian Relations
Full report at: http://commonspace.eu/eng/blogs/15/author9/id78

commonspace.eu, February 12, 2013
Opinion: in order to evaluate the potential of their economic and commercial cooperation, Turkey and Armenia should solve their diplomatic and political problems
Full article at: http://commonspace.eu/eng/opinions/6/id2569

EurasiaNet.org, February 14, 2013
Azerbaijan: Writer Buckling Under Strain of Literary Controversy

Full article at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66556

Todays Zaman, February 17, 2013
“Stone Dreams” breaks stereotypes between Azeris, Armenians

Full article at: http://todayszaman.com/news-307281-stone-dreams-breaks-stereotypes-between-azeris-armenians.html

REPORTS

European Policy Centre, February 14, 2013
Democratization, modernization and globalization – The EU and the hard tasks facing the three South Caucasus nations
Full article at: http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3330_three_south_caucasus_nations.pdf

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy, February 18, 2013
A new parliamentary effort to create a stability pact in the South
Caucasus
Full article at: http://www.assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=19486&Language=EN

The peace process in the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh has reached its deepest deadlock since Armenians and Azerbaijanis sat at the negotiation table to strike a truce back in 1994. Recent developments such as the escalation in cross-border skirmishes and the infamous ‘Safarov affair’, paired with the ongoing and unabated war rhetoric, have aggravated to an unprecedented extent the rift between the sides at both state and societal levels. Concerns of possible resumption of hostilities have mounted. With signs of change of the climate lacking on the horizon, even the ‘cautious optimists’ among observers seem to have grown skeptical.

The absence of any palpable progress in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks is often attributed to external actors, and the Minsk Group co-chair countries — France, Russia and the U.S. — are naturally the first suspects. It is argued that external geostrategic interests entrenched in the region are increasingly the reason why the conflict effectively remains locked up to date.

Of the countries with such stakes, Russia bears the lion’s share of the blame. Pundits and observers from Yerevan to Baku, from Washington to Brussels have been arguing that Moscow is not interested in the resolution of the conflict. It is widely believed that Russia thwarts conflict resolution efforts and supports the status quo instead, since the latter allows Moscow to keep the region under its hook.

The Kremlin’s own practice of exerting aggressive tactics and instruments in its foreign policy, even more so in its post-Soviet neigbourhood, only fuels this perception. Russia’s perceived negative role in other conflicts — Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Transnistrian — is automatically ascribed to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, too.

But a closer look at the current state of affairs unveils a less unequivocal picture of this engagement. While it is only true that Russia has been capitalising on the conflict to advance its interests vis-à-vis both Armenia and Azerbaijan, its role in the conflict’s resolution remains largely overestimated. There is no evidence in particular as to how Russia could possibly hinder the conflict’s resolution if Armenians and Azerbaijanis were truly ready for that; or else, how Moscow could help resolve it all alone without having the commitment and investment from the conflicting sides.

Beefed up by Moscow’s own aspirations and rhetoric, and with wider geopolitical deliberations dominating minds across the board, it appears now that Russia is being attributed a more significant role than it actually has. But while it is impossible to overlook the impact of broader regional geostrategic projections on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, overestimating their role can carry even more negative implications for the conflict’s settlement. Putting the whole blame for hitherto failed attempts at resolution on external actors and their interests is a dangerous trend. It fails to reflect the essence of the conflict itself whilst effectively nourishing the delusion that the key to resolution is not in the hands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis but elsewhere. It may also serve as a convenient distraction for the conflicting sides that are neither ready nor willing to take full and equal responsibility for resolving the conflict.

Overview of Russian engagement

The role played by Soviet central authorities, and later Russians, during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh is a subject of heated debates and various interpretations. The Kremlin’s own attitude towards the conflict has been controversial and has come a long way since the time when the dormant dispute started to brew anew back in 1987. This was arguably meant to be one of the engines, if not the most crucial one,that set a ticking clock to the end of an empire that existed for around 70 years.

Back then, the complaints of Karabakh Armenians about being discriminated against within the Azerbaijan SSR and their demand to join the Armenian SSR was seen by Soviet leaders as an encroachment upon the unity and stability of the Union. Fearing a spillover effect across the Union, the Soviet central authorities saw the wrong solution to the issue. The measures they thought would allay the tension had the reverse effects. Attempts to suppress the Karabakh movement, punishment actions supported and carried out against Armenians only fueled hostilities and eventually took the situation to a full-scale war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis.[1]

As the Soviet empire collapsed, Russians got engaged in the conflict through provision of weapons and logistic support to both sides.  This paradox had various reasons. Different interest groups among those in power in Russia, at that time chaotic and unstable, had their favourites in the conflicting sides. On other occasions, however, Moscow tried to pursue broader strategic goals and sided with one of the two conflicting camps, depending on the call of the day. This made its engagement even more controversial.

As the short-lived ideological struggle inside Russia ended with the victory of Eurasists, Russia’s further engagement in the conflict and its settlement came in line with its more assertive foreign policy in the post-Soviet space and its self-proclaimed role of the security and stability guarantor in the region. With this proactive policy line, Moscow meant to deter the emergence of other geopolitical actors willing to fill in the post-Cold War power vacuum across the region.

Subsequently, Moscow’s mediation efforts within the Minsk Process have been paired with its own assertive diplomatic undertakings. The cease-fire agreement of 1994 that remains the main document to ensure the fragile truce, despite continuous violations, has become the most important juncture of Russian engagement.  But while acting as the chief broker of the peace deal, Russia also tried to secure the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone. As seen from Moscow, this would allow a deeper Russian presence and consequently more influence in the region.

Russian diplomatic activity was initially viewed by sound mistrust on the part of its western partners. Over time, however, as Russia’s special interests in the post-Soviet space received a somewhat tacit recognition, its preferential involvement in the conflict’s resolution became less of a frustration for its western partners. At the same time, its relative levers over both Armenia and Azerbaijan started to be viewed as a valuable instrument to steer the sides towards a solution. Finally, Russia remained a somewhat more comprehensible and acceptable broker for both Armenians and Azerbaijanis, with closer ties and similar political cultures acting as facilitating determinants.

Not having any specific strategy towards the conflict, Russian policymakers have found what it seems a comfortable middle-ground of sitting on two chairs. During the course of the last decade, Russia has been trying to portray itself, and consequently act, as an honest broker between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Accordingly, neither its close economic and military alliance with Armenia, nor its pragmatic partnership with Azerbaijan have shifted its position on Nagorno-Karabakh. At the same time, Moscow has been capitalising on the conflict by becoming the main arms supplier to both sides: in 2007-2011 it provided 55% of Azerbaijan’s and 96% of Armenia’s arms imports.[2] The Karabakh issue also remains high on the agenda of bilateral meetings of Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents with their Russian counterpart. This often offers room for various speculations about bilateral arrangements behind the back of the other side.

This inconsistent and contradictory engagement in the capacity of a peace broker on the one hand and arms dealer on the other hand, paired with Armenian-Russian and Azerbaijani-Russian bilateral tit-for-tat deals, has been drawing mixed reactions from both conflicting sides and external actors, with everyone continuously questioning the real intentions Moscow might be having.

Perceptions of Russian engagement

Most concerns about a negative Russian role in the conflict resolution efforts are connected with perceptions of Russia’s pursuit of underlying geopolitical interests. Oftentimes, the Kremlin’s ideological foes in the West and elsewhere tend to view the Karabakh conflict predominantly through the prism of much-feared Russian resurgence in its post-Soviet ‘near abroad’. Hence the undertones of this approach. The perception is that, in its bid to deepen its influence in what comprises an area of vital Russian interests, Moscow simply wouldn’t let the conflict be solved. Settlement of this conflict, they argue, would mend the entire Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan divide and effectively bring to the loss of Moscow’s regional clout. This leads to conclude that Russia’s interests lie in supporting the status quo[3]. The Kremlin’s assertive, often aggressive regional policy and attempts to be the first among equals within the Minsk Group have been reinforcing this perception. Perhaps the belief that Russia has enough instruments to prod the conflicting sides towards a solution, yet not seeing Moscow acting in that direction, has been another source of suspicion towards the latter. Finally, the sudden Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 came to further strengthen this thesis. Many observers drew parallels with a potentially similar Russian role in case of a war over Nagorno-Karabakh, despite substantial differences in Russia’s positions and levers on the ground.

But while the Kremlin has been pursuing its own interests all the way long, the history of the last two decades has not seen Armenians and Azerbaijanis impatiently willing to strike a peace deal and Moscow hindering them from doing it. The Russian role in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, whether negative or not, is rather defined in bilateral relations, based on the major perceptions in Armenia and Azerbaijan and on how Russia itself treats those perceptions.

Driven by Russia’s incentives to play on both sides, Armenians and Azerbaijanis have easily embraced the logic that even 20 years since the states have gained independence, garnering Moscow’s (or anyone else’s) support is somewhat important and decisive to solve the conflict on their own terms. Therefore, both sides have been trying to tip the balance in their own favour by influencing Moscow’s position.

On the Armenian side, the expectations from Russia mainly derive from what is considered to be a strategic partnership between the two. Armenia remains Russia’s only ally in the region, with the Russian military and economic presence in the country being the indication of that. Mutual defense clause applies to their relationship both in bilateral ties and within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). An August 2010 agreement extended the life of the Russian military base in Gyumri, Northern Armenia, by 2044.

Yet Armenia’s somewhat flawed foreign and domestic policy line over the last decade resulted in putting critical assets of national security importance under Russian control. This has pushed the Yerevan-Moscow strategic partnership off the rails, turning it into a rather unequal alliance. It is then understandable that over the last few years the feeling has been prevailing in Armenia that Yerevan’s commitment to this alliance is being taken for granted by Moscow. Russia is increasingly seen as pursuing its own interests, often to the detriment of Armenia, and not being fully committed to the status of this relationship, contrary to what is being declared.

From Yerevan’s perspective, Moscow, in the spirit of strategic partnership, should at least refrain from developing the types of cooperation with Azerbaijan that are potentially harming for Armenian interests.  But military cooperation in the form of arms sales to Azerbaijan, that of late included strategic S-300 missile systems, has been raising eyebrows in Armenia. Up until recently, the country’s officials and policymakers tended to keep a rather cool face on these developments. Instead, analysts and foreign policy watchers were the ones to increasingly voice their resentment on such events, seen as contributing to Baku’s war rhetoric. But in late December 2012, speaking at a CSTO session in Moscow, Armenia’s president Serzh Sargsyan for the first time expressed also Yerevan’s official frustration with Russia’s arms deals with Azerbaijan in a thinly-veiled, indirect remark.[4]

Though Armenia is widely seen as being inherently pro-Russian and historically promoting the Russian interests in the region, Armenians have their own fair reasons of being suspicious towards the Kremlin. They do associate the Karabakh conflict’s roots and causes with Soviet leader Josef Stalin’s unilateral decision to grant Nagorno-Karabakh to Soviet Azerbaijan back in 1921, much as a gesture to Kemalist Turkey with which the Soviets had aligned at that time. They also keep in mind late Soviet involvement, and inaction, in the violence against Armenians as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict broke out. All this, paired with some other historical grievances, is well entrenched into the public memory and resurfaces on every occasion giving the impression that Armenian interests can be compromised for Russian interests.

Against the background of growing suspicion towards Russia and the emergence of new opportunities for development, the country’s alliance with Moscow is tacitly changing patterns and undertones. Over the last year or two, Yerevan has been trying to live up to its declared foreign policy of complementarity and diversify its economic and political ties. This was particularly reflected in Armenia’s sudden and full-throttle drive towards deeper European integration, much to Russian dismay and amidst the pressure on Armenia to join Putin’s brainchild, the so-called Eurasian Union — a project which Yerevan has explicitly declared as economically irrelevant vis-à-vis its own interests.

Nevertheless, the country’s policies in the military and security spheres remain the prerogative of its alliance with Moscow. Wider geopolitical considerations still make the two natural allies. Yerevan counts Russian position on the conflict as important, also not to allow that Moscow-Baku relations evolve further on.

In much contrast to Yerevan, and by virtue of its energy card, Baku has had the advantage to carry out a more independent foreign policy line vis-à-vis Russia. Despite this relative freedom of manoeuvre, which Baku often juxtaposes to Armenia’s lack thereof, it still takes to heart everything Moscow has to say about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Baku and Moscow have managed to establish a friendly and pragmatic partnership over the last decade, despite earlier points of tension and antagonism between the two. Baku sees opportunities for itself in Russian attempts to court Azerbaijan to get more access to Caspian hydrocarbon resources and upset the plans to pipe more Azerbaijani resources in western direction. The two also have the shared interest of preventing potential instability in the North Caucasus. The conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh, however, remains a painful point for Baku in its relations with Moscow.

Azerbaijan appears to hold a much ambivalent stance on Russia’s involvement in the region. On one hand it is most unhappy about Russia’s engagement in the region. On the other hand, it also appears to be the side attaching utmost importance to Russia’s past and prospective role in the Karabakh conflict and its resolution. Baku’s frustration with Moscow’s political-military alliance with Yerevan and the Russian military base in Armenia has made it a vocal critic of Russian presence in the region. Azerbaijan consistently refers, at various levels, to Moscow’s negative role in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Contributing to this is also the Azerbaijani narrative suggesting that during the Karabakh war Russians sided with Armenians and that if it hadn’t been for this support, Armenians would not have been able to achieve the military advantages they have. While this narrative overestimates Russian support to the Armenian side and effectively overlooks that support to the Azerbaijani side[5], it nevertheless remains the main source of suspicion towards Russia. Coupled with the current Armenia-Russia military alliance that developed since independence, this narrative further consolidates the embedded sense of victimization on the Azerbaijani side. It also nourishes the belief that getting Russian support is decisive and makes official Baku seek ways to reverse the perceived tide in its direction.

Accordingly, Azerbaijan’s generally adopted policy of leveraging its energy resources in a quid pro quo bid to secure foreign support on Nagorno-Karabakh has also been employed in its relations with Moscow.

Pointing to Armenia’s overly reliance on Russia, Azerbaijani policymakers and analysts alike have been presuming that, with so many levers over its strategic partner, Moscow could easily exert pressure on the Armenian side over the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh[6]. They have been expecting, in particular, that Russia could secure unconditional withdrawal of Karabakh Armenian forces from the regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.[7] Baku appears to be under the impression that a perceived Russian pressure on Armenia could fast-forward the Karabakh resolution process without causing Azerbaijan the discomfort of investing any capital of its own. The conviction that the conflict would have been resolved long ago — and on terms that would satisfy Azerbaijan — if only Russia wanted, remains by and large unchallenged among Azerbaijan’s political elite and wider public alike.

Underlying in these perceptions is the expectation that Russia should be taking sides.  But Moscow has been disappointing all at once by refusing to align with anyone.

Attempt at a realistic assessment

As of late, Russia has been experiencing a range of foreign policy embarrassments. As its European and U.S. partners keep pressuring Russia on its unfair gas sale practices and poor human rights record,, Russia is also witnessing its influence waning in the neigbourhood. All the more so, and against the still prevailing perceptions, Russia increasingly has less influence over the Karabakh peace process.

Unlike the cases of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, where Russia offers financial and moral support to the unrecognised republics and has its military forces situated on their territories, Moscow neither has any troops deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh, nor even direct contacts with its leadership. At the same time, its relative levers over Armenia are erroneously ascribed also to Nagorno-Karabakh. In a situation where even Yerevan and Stepanakert have principally divergent views[8] around the peace process, Moscow has no lever or influence over Stepanakert.

By the same token, the Russian official approach to the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh is in stark contrast with how it treats other conflicts. Whilst Moscow has been at odds with its western partners over the recognition of Kosovo and declared that it could then serve as a precedent for Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, it cautiously omitted any linkage to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Russia’s support for the status quo is not so unambiguous either. Its interests primarily rest in the non-resumption of hostilities around Nagorno-Karabakh. The last thing Moscow would like is to be forced to take sides in a possible military escalation of the conflict, undermining its credibility as an honest broker and security guarantor. In broader terms, as long as military escalation remains the only alternative, not only Russia, but also other mediators see the status quo as a feasible short-term solution. There seems to be a tacit understanding that, in a situation where the sides fail to agree to even basic confidence-building measures, sheer advocacy of ‘the unacceptability of the status quo’ can be interpreted wrongly by one side or another and inadvertedly prompt a military escalation. Therefore, despite the standstill in talks, Minsk Group mediators have primarily centered their efforts on keeping Armenia and Azerbaijan on board diplomatically as long as the sides themselves are not ready to positively challenge the status quo.

The assumption that Moscow could make use of its strategic posture vis-à-vis Armenia and Azerbaijan and push them towards settlement has also proven untenable. It is true that Russia has influence over both countries. Lately, this has been demonstrated by increasing gas prices for Armenia in critical electoral period, forcing the authorities in Yerevan to hide the fact so as to avoid public discontent before elections. Meanwhile, the creation of so-called Billionaire Club of Azerbaijani businessmen in Russia was viewed in Baku as a Moscow-led attempt to challenge Ilham Aliyev’s regime in Azerbaijan. Moscow has been more successful in gaining bilateral advantages by playing the economic and domestic political cards in these countries. For both Armenian and Azerbaijani ruling elites, who are often bashed for democratic deficit and flawed human rights records by their European and American partners, seeking Moscow’s endorsement to fill in domestic and foreign legitimacy gap has somewhat been rendered important in the past.

But the fact that this influence is more of a two-way street, however unequal it might be, is often overlooked. Moscow, albeit masterful in hiding it, also fears losing its partners. Armenia’s geostrategic importance for Russia cannot be underestimated, however unequal their alliance. Similarly, Moscow invests a lot in its partnership with Baku and would avoid resorting to actions that would trigger the latter’s unconditional alignment with the West. And since Georgia veered off the Russian orbit of influence, Moscow is even more interested in not losing any more friends in the Caucasus.

With the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh pertaining to identity and strategic national interests for both Armenians and Azerbaijanis, it is also less subject to outside pressure. Any attempt at coercing the sides without offering real win-win incentives would rather drive them farther away from each other, as well as strip Moscow of its credibility in the eye of the conflicting sides. In light of this, officials and strategists in Moscow have apparently come into the conclusion that Russia’s primary power in the conflict rests in its neutrality. All the more so having the failed example of Turkey, whose overt alignment with one of the parties has not only made it impossible to have any constructive role in the conflict’s resolution, but has also straitjacketed Ankara’s aspired clout in the region.

Analysts and experts across the board have been having a hard time predicting whether or not Russia would interfere in case of a possible war between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, in accordance with the defense frameworks with Armenia. Moscow itself has left ample room for interpretation by not being very reactive and vocal in condemning larger-scale cease-fire violations on one side and by continuously enhancing the military component of its alliance with Armenia on the other side.

Formally, neither the Armenia-Russia, nor the CSTO defense clause can be invoked as long as Republic of Armenia’s state borders are not threatened. Hence military escalation in the Line of Contact around Nagorno-Karabakh would not induce the mutual defense clause. Besides, contrary to the widespread perception, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian military base in Armenia essentially remained there to curb potential military threats emanating from Turkey rather than Azerbaijan, as the former at some point considered intervening at the Karabakh war on behalf of its ally Azerbaijan. With the regional geostrategic alliances and divides still remaining by and large the same, the primary role of the base remains unchanged, too.

The preferential arms transfer from Russia has allowed Armenia to compensate lack of resources and keep in pace with the mounting arms acquisition of Azerbaijan powered by abundant oil revenues. Yet the role of the ‘Russian factor’ in the prevention of hostilities also appears to be not the essential one. It is the strong defense capacities and terrain advantages of the Karabakh Armenian forces across the Line of Contact, as well as Armenian deterrence capabilities, that are in the first place believed to maintain the military balance in the region in a way as to not allow Azerbaijan feel comfortable about translating its war rhetoric into a military revisionism on the ground.[9]

Indeed, Moscow has offered a reluctant and late reaction to the most recent large-scale cease-fire violations of June 2012. Russia’s official reaction to the incidents that clearly incurred violation of Armenia’s state border near the north-eastern Tavush region came only third after reactions by the U.S. and France. Similarly, the Kremlin was three days late in its low-level reaction to the late August 2012 extradition and pardoning of the convicted Azerbaijani officer Ramil Safarov who had axed his Armenian colleague at a NATO training in Budapest back in 2004. Instead, the responsibility to reinforce the mutual defense clause with Armenia every once in a while has been left to Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the CSTO. These conjunctures have not only reinforced the impression that Moscow is extremely uncomfortable about taking stance forcefully, even in line with its bilateral commitments, but also further vocalised growing anti-Kremlin sentiments in public debates in Armenia.

Arguably, Moscow would even be interested in championing some solution between Armenia and Azerbaijan to turn its virtual rhetoric into a more weighty influence on the ground. Most recently this was demonstrated in Russia’s former president Dmitry Medvedev’s attempt to spearhead an agreement between the sides. During his one-term-long presidency, Medvedev facilitated more than 10 trilateral meetings with Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents. It was widely agreed that securing some kind of a progress in the peace talks was a matter of personal reputation for him. This phase of active Russian mediation, however, ended up in fiasco with the 2011 Kazan meeting revealing a deep stalemate in the peace process. Some analysts suggest that Russia’s diplomatic activity has also been driven by the motivation to portray itself as a reliable and cooperative partner for the West by demonstrating that regional security and stability are a shared interest among them.[10]

Russia’s incumbent president Vladimir Putin’s cooler stance and lack of enthusiasm towards the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process is arguably attributed to the fact that Moscow repeatedly finds itself in a situation when its perceived strong influence is being challenged by its inability to secure a deal among the sides.

Conclusion

Whether or not Russia demonstrates a proactive stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, it remains an important actor both being a critical member in the Minsk Group mediation efforts and by virtue of its bilateral ties with the conflicting sides. However, its role in the resolution of the conflict should not be overestimated.

Perhaps the main source of overall frustration with Russia’s engagement has been the unfulfilled expectations from Moscow on all fronts. The loaded belief that Russia could prod the sides towards a solution, or — as seen from the part of Armenians and Azerbaijanis — take sides and support their ‘own truth’, have resulted in disappointment and the tendency to blame Russia for the failures of the peace process — more so on the part of Azerbaijan.

As Russia has been building on the conflict when pursuing its own, wider agendas in the region, this has also not allowed many to see the limits of its influence on the conflict’s resolution. Recent developments demonstrated that Moscow has neither enough instruments to forge a solution, nor willingness to offer one-sided advantages to any of the sides. Its perceived capability to influence the process, therefore, repeatedly proves not any more effective than that of Washington’s or Paris’s, or all three of them together. Moscow also sufficiently lacks real soft-power practices and incentives that could perhaps prove a valuable tool combined with its general clout in the region. Finally, Russia’s engagement essentially remains a two-way street and will continue to depend on not only its own ambitions but also the policy choices made by Yerevan and Baku.

Overall, attributing unwarranted meanings to the Russian factor has proven counterproductive on all possible sides. By doing so, Armenia and Azerbaijan have voluntarily conferred more clout upon Moscow in their bilateral relations with it.  Placing hopes on one-sided advantages Moscow could be granting has also been creating unrealistic expectations in the parties and negatively affecting their commitment to the peace process. In a sense, the Russian factor has also been serving as a convenient distraction for the sides from the need to take more responsibility for the conflict’s resolution on their own.

On the other side, the tendency — more seen among western observers — to load the conflict with overwhelming geopolitical implications has been another faulty line of perception. Treating the conflict chiefly as a pawn in Russia’s hands in its regional power games has often been developing a sort of ignorance towards the very conflict and its sensitivities. The conflict’s own dynamics and specifics, immediate security challenges, the understanding of why and how the sides’ interests lie in where they are, and finally the most important — human dimension of the  conflict, have somewhat been overlooked and overshadowed by the failure to see a more grounded and sensitive picture behind banal geopolitics.

Finally, awarding Russia such a crucial role could eventually become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Blaming Russia for all the wrong things developing in the post-Soviet space has already been nourishing an overstretched, and wrong, rhetoric in some Russian political circles. For the past two decades, they have been advocating that the post-Soviet countries, by and large, cannot move forward without Russia’s ‘strong hand’ pushing them from behind. Overall, however, the general trend in the Russian policymaking community has been adherence to more realpolitik considerations regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While Moscow is still competitive and hostile to some cases of outside ‘intervention’ in the region, it tends to approach many regional issues as mutually inclusive, rather than exclusive, in relation with other partners. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of those issues around which Russia is eager to cooperate with its western partners.

It is very unlikely that the state of affairs around Russia’s role, and the importance Armenians and Azerbaijanis attach to it falters any time soon. Neither will Moscow give up its tactics of sitting on two chairs and leveraging the conflict for its own benefits. It is however important to recognise these dynamics as a result of the current stalemate rather than the cause of it and accentuate on immediate conflict resolution efforts rather than on extraneous distractions.

In this sense, Armenians and Azerbaijanis should be the primary sides least interested in the ‘geopoliticalisation’ of the conflict. Only in relation and in cooperation with each other can both preserve important national interests and work out win-win solutions.  The fact that Russia’s say is rendered so important at all fronts, while the primary party to the conflict — the de facto republic of Nagorno-Karabakh — remains absent from the peace process also demonstrates the somewhat inherently flawed logic behind the ongoing peace process and the limits of what it can achieve. Regardless of what third sided interests are involved, it is the prerogative of Armenians and Azerbaijanis to achieve the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The key to conflict’s resolution is neither in Moscow nor elsewhere, but in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan.